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Abstract
This paper studies the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) adverse selection environment,
relaxing the assumption of exclusivity of insurance contracts. There are three types of
agents that dier in their risk level, their riskiness is private information and known
before any contract is signed. Agents can engage in multiple insurance contracts simul-
taneously, and the terms of these contracts are not observed by other rms. Insurance
providers behave non-cooperatively and compete oering menus of insurance contracts
from an unrestricted contract space. We derive conditions under which a separating
equilibrium exists and fully characterize it. The unique equilibrium allocation consists
of agents with a lower probability of accident purchasing no insurance and agents with
higher accident probability buying the actuarially-fair level of insurance. The equilib-
rium allocation also constitutes a linear price schedule for insurance. To sustain the
equilibrium allocation, rms must oer latent contracts. These contracts are necessary
to prevent deviations by other rms; in particular they can prevent cream-skimming
strategies. As in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), pooling equilibrium still fails to exists.
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In this paper we address the question of what type of insurance contracts emerge when
insurance providers compete among themselves. We are interested in environments where
the insured have private information on their risk probability and can sign without being
observed multiple insurance contracts with dierent insurance providers.
Insurance contracts are written to oset the risk associated with a wide variety of events.
Examples of dierent types of insurance contracts include insurance against person-related
events (medical, life, annuities), property events (car, home), and nancial events (credit
default swaps).1 These insurance contracts share two common properties: the realization of
uncertainty can be veried, and subscribers might have additional private information about
the probabilities that an event realizes. However, due to dierent regulatory oversight, a
feature that varies greatly amongst them is the ability of the insurer to enter into additional
contracts with other insurance providers. This possibility of non-exclusive insurance holding,
while rare in property insurance, is a denite possibility { for example, in the case of credit
default swaps.2
Motivated by the above observations we investigate the restrictions on the equilibrium
insurance contracts that arise once we dispense with the exclusivity assumption. We consider
a variation of the standard Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) (RS henceforth) environment.
Agents are subject to uncertainty regarding their endowment realization, the endowment
can be either high or low. We consider three types of agents, each type features dierent
probability of the high realization of the endowment. This probability is private information
of the agent. Dierently from RS we allow agents to engage in multiple insurance contracts
simultaneously with multiple insurance providers. The key assumption is that the terms of
these contracts are not observed by other insurance providers. Insurance providers behave
non-cooperatively and compete oering menus of insurance contracts from an unrestricted
contract space. We derive parameter restrictions under which a separating equilibrium exists
and fully characterize it. The unique equilibrium allocation consists of agents with the
lowest probability of receiving the high realization of endowment (the bad type) buying the
actuarially-fair level of insurance. The other two types with medium and high probability of
high endowment realization (the medium and good type) purchase no insurance.
1For a review, refer to Due (1999). For recent empirical pricing evidence refer to Blanco, Brennan, and
Marsh (2005).
2Until early 2009, credit default swaps were issued in private bilateral trades without any intermediation
by any clearing house. On March 10, 2009ICE TrustTM began operating as a central counter party clearing
house for credit default swaps in North America.
2Similarly to our paper, the equilibrium allocation in RS features full insurance at the
fair price for the low type. Dierently from our paper in RS (see also Wilson (1977)) the
medium and high type receive a positive amount of insurance. Another key dierence with
respect to RS are the condition required for existence. In our environment these conditions
are stronger, this is due to the nature of non exclusive competition that allows for additional
types of deviation by entrants that are not present in RS. When an equilibrium exists we
nd that latent contracts must be oered by insurance providers. These are contract oered
in equilibrium but not chosen by any type. These contracts are necessary to prevent cream-
skimming deviations by entrants and also deviations by incumbents. This highlights the
dual role that non-exclusivity plays in our environment. First, by allowing agents to sign
additional insurance contracts, it constitutes a constraint on what an insurance providers can
oer hence limiting the availability of insurance and in certain cases leading to non existence
of equilibrium. Second, non exclusivity enables insurance providers to sustain equilibrium
contracts. Deviations from equilibrium can by prevented with the threat that any agent can
combine latent contracts with the ones oered following a deviation. This behavior makes
it impossible for an entrant to separate dierent agent types.
Related Literature
This paper is related to two large and growing literatures. The rst one studies problems
with adverse selection. It originates from the pioneering work of Akerlof (1970), Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976), Wilson (1977) and Miyazaki (1977).3 From this literature we take our
basic setup where agents seek insurance and are privately informed on their risk type. The
second one is a more recent literature focusing on non exclusive contracting, see for example
the work of Epstein and Peters (1999), Peters (2001), Martimort and Stole (2002) and
references therein. In these papers a principal cannot prevent an agent to contract with
other competing principals. In addition contracts are private information of the agent and
the counterparty. From this literature, as in Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2000), we adopt
the approach to equilibrium characterization. We consider the case where each individual
insurance provider oers a set of menus of contracts and delegates the choice to the agent
on which insurance contract to pick.
The closest paper to hours is Attar, Mariotti, and Salani e (2011a) independently de-
veloped during the same time as ours. The two papers share many similarities and some
dierences. There are three main dierences in terms of modeling assumptions. First, their
paper restricts the analysis to the two types case, while we consider agents with three pri-
vately observed types. Second, they consider the case without free entry while we consider
3For a review refer to Dionne, Doherty, and Fombaron (2001).
3the case with free entry. Finally, although their preference specication is more general
nesting both a pure trade environment and an insurance environment, the restriction on
insurance purchase is dierent in the two papers. In our paper any insurance purchase that
does not lead to negative consumption is allowed. On the other hand Attar, Mariotti, and
Salani e (2011a) considers either the case either with arbitrary amount of insurance (without
non-negativity constraint on consumption) or the case with only positive insurance (in the
appendix). Both papers reach similar results: pooling equilibrium fails to exists, the agent
with the highest risk reach full insurance, while for everybody else no insurance is provided.
An equilibrium may fail to exist altogether. In the body of the paper we highlight additional
similarities and dierences.
This paper is also related to a series of papers that analyze the eect of non-exclusive
contracting in the purchase of goods. One of the rst papers to do so is Biais, Martimort,
and Rochet (2000). The authors consider an environment where competing traders provide
liquidity to a risk-averse agent who is privately informed on the value of an asset. As in this
paper, the agent is not restricted in trading with only one trader. Moreover traders compete
among each other using menus of possible trades. Dierently from our paper, they consider
an environment where goods are being traded rather than insurance and they consider the
case where the privately observed type can take a continuum of values while we consider a
nite (three) number of types. Ales and Maziero (2010) study a dynamic environment with
private information (but unlike this paper, the realization of private information happens
after agents sign the contract) where agents can engage in multiple non-exclusive contracts for
both labor and credit relationships. The paper shows that a unique equilibrium always exists
and that latent contracts are necessary. As in this paper, the equilibrium can be implemented
using linear contracts for wages and bonds. In a recent paper, Attar, Mariotti, and Salani e
(2011b) extend the environment of Akerlof (1970) to include non-exclusive contracting. They
show, contrary to this paper, that a unique equilibrium always exists. Similarly to this
paper the equilibrium involves linear prices, and is sustained by latent contracts. Arnott
and Stiglitz (1991) and Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) study static moral hazard environments
where agents trade in non exclusive relationships. In particular, the latter shows that latent
contracts are necessary to sustain the equilibrium and lead to positive prot for the insurance
providers. In our paper insurance provide will generate zero prots. Finally Parlour and
Rajan (2001) and Attar, Campioni, and Piaser (2006) study the eect of non exclusive
relationships for the provision of credit either under limited commitment (the former) or
under moral hazard (the latter).
In spirit, this paper is also related to an earlier literature focused on modifying the equi-
4librium concept rst studied by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In particular Wilson (1977)
extends the equilibrium concept used in RS beyond static Nash equilibrium by allowing in-
surance providers to take into account how a change in their policy oers might aect the
set of policies oered by other insurance providers. In our paper, latent contracts play a sim-
ilar role to these non stationary expectations by enabling a reaction of insurance providers
to deviations of other insurance providers. On a similar note are the papers that study
inter-rm communication in insurance settings, such as Jaynes (1978) and Hellwig (1988).4
The rst considers a static adverse selection economy and allows rms the choice to disclose
or not information on who accepts the insurance contract. It shows that some rms will
share information leading to a separating equilibrium (that always exists), while in the case
where no information is shared, no equilibrium exists. Sharing information allows a rm to
oer an insurance contract that is contingent on additional purchases of insurance an agent
might accept. In our paper, rms gather information on insurance purchased by also oering
latent contracts, which allows us, in contrast to Jaynes, to have an equilibrium even without
any information being shared directly. Latent contracts have the same role as information
sharing, since they enable rms to react to deviation of incumbent rms. Hellwig (1988)
highlights that the ability to react is the key to equilibrium existence rather than inter-rm
communication. In particular, inter-rm communication enables rms to react only if the
equilibrium concept considered in Jaynes (1978) is implicitly assuming a non-stationary ex-
pectation similar to Wilson (1977). Along similar lines, Picard (2009) considers the case
where the contracts oered by the insurance providers feature participating clauses so that
the payout will be conditional on the prots of the insurance provider. In this setup it
is shown that an equilibrium always exists and coincides with the Miyazaki-Spence-Wilson
allocation.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the environment. Characterization
and implementation are studied respectively in Sections 3 and 4. In Section 4.1 we compare
directly the current paper to the equilibrium allocation characterized in Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976). Section 5 concludes.
2 Environment
The economy is populated by a continuum of measure one of agents and countably many
insurance providers. We assume free-entry in the insurance market.5 Agents are ex ante
4For an extension to a moral hazard environment, also look at Hellwig (1983).
5In Attar, Mariotti, and Salani e (2011a) the number of rms is xed.
5heterogeneous. We consider three types of agents. There is a fraction pg of type g agents (the
good type) a fraction pb of type b (the bad type) and a remaining fraction pm = 1 pg pb of
type m (the medium type).6 We assume that pb > 0, pm > 0 and pg > 0.7 The economy lasts
for 1 period. Agents' utility u is dened over consumption c. Assume u : R+ ! R is a twice
continuously dierentiable, increasing, and strictly concave function. At time 1, an agent
of type j = b;m;g receives an endowment !H with probability j and !L with probability
1 j. Let !H > !L and denote ! = (!L;!H). The realization of the endowment is publicly
observed. Assume that g > m > b, that these probabilities are private information of the
agent and that are known to the agent before signing any insurance contract. Dene the
market (average) probability of high realization as b p = pgg +pmm +pbb. The probability




In this environment, each agent seeks to insure himself against the uncertain realization
of the endowment. Insurance will be provided by insurance providers (referred to as rms
in the body of the paper). Denote by I the number rms active in equilibrium. Each
rm i 2 f1;:::;Ig oers insurance contracts to agents. A contract prescribes consumption
transfers conditional on the realization of the endowment. The key feature of our environment
is that agents can simultaneously sign contracts with more than one rm and that the terms
of the contract between an agent and any rm are not observed by other rms. As described
in Martimort and Stole (2002) and Peters (2001), due to the delegation principle, we can
restrict the analysis to menu games. In a menu game, each rm i oers a menu: a set Ci in
P(R2) (the power set of R2).8 Elements of Ci are transfers pairs, i = (i
L;i
H), conditional
on a realization respectively of !L or !H. We do not impose any restriction on the type
of menus oered by rms. We do require however that each rm oers the null transfer
(0;0). Note that a menu might contain more alternatives than the number of types, given
our focus on symmetric equilibria this will imply that some alternatives will not be chosen
in equilibrium. We denote a contract as latent if it is oered in equilibrium by some rm







H;j) is the pair of transfers chosen by an agent of type j within the menu oered
by rm i. Let C = C1 :::CI. The expected utility for an agent of type j = b;m;g given
6The original insurance problem discussed in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) focuses on two types only.
Refer to Wilson (1977) for the case with multiple types.
7The case with one of the pj = 0 with j = b;m;g, reduces the environment to one with only two types
of agents. This case was studied in a previous version of this paper. All of the results of this paper hold in
that case also.
8We do not allow the use of random contracts.
























We will focus on symmetric equilibria hence we require that agents of the same type will
choose the same allocation. Firms are risk neutral. Their objective is to maximize prots by
optimally choosing a menu. A rm takes as given the menus oered by other rms, denoted


















i; 8 j 2 fb;m;gg
We can now dene equilibrium in the menu game
Denition 1 (Equilibrium). A pure strategy symmetric equilibrium of the menu game is a
collection of menus Ci for all i 2 f1;:::;Ig and agents' choices (L;j;H;j), for all j = b;m;g
such that:
1. For each j = b;m;g, (L;j;H;j) is a solution of the agent problem (1).
2. For each i 2 f1;:::;Ig, taking as given C i and agents' choice (L;j;H;j) for each
j = b;m;g, Ci solves (2).
For notation convenience we consider, in the body of the paper, utility and prots derived
from consumption transfers rather than by menus. Let c = (cL;cH) denote the consumption
in the low and hight state realization. For a given type j = b;m;g, with a slight abuse of
notation denote by Uj(c) = ju(cH) + (1   j)u(cL). In this case Uj(!) is the utility in
autarky for agents of type j. Conditional on agents of type j 2 fb;m;gg accepting contract
 = (L;H), prots are equal to j() =  jH   (1   j)(L). Similarly, if multiple types
j;j0 accept the contract we denote the prots with j;j0() =  b pjj0H   (1   b pjj0)(L). If all
three types accept the contract  then we denote prots with ().
3 Characterization of Equilibrium
A rst straightforward result is that in any equilibrium prots for the rms must be non-
negative: for all i, (Ci;C i)  0. To characterize equilibrium, we consider two cases. The
7rst case refers to a pooling equilibrium. In this case agents of all three types receive the
same equilibrium allocation. In the next subsection we show that this type of equilibrium
never exists. A second type of equilibrium, a separating equilibrium, occurs when at least two
types receive a dierent consumption allocation. In subsection 3.2, we show that the unique
equilibrium of the menu game is a separating equilibrium with the following characteristics:
agents of type b (the bad type) receive full insurance against the realization of the endowment
at their actuarially-fair price, while agents of types m and g, receive no insurance.
3.1 Pooling Equilibrium
We rst determine necessary conditions that any pooling equilibrium must satisfy. In this
subsection we let c = (cL;cH) be the candidate polling equilibrium level of consumption for
the three types.
Lemma 1. For any pooling equilibrium allocation for consumption c = (cL;cH), the following
conditions must hold:
cL  cH; (3)






1   b p
b p
; (4)






1   b p
b p
: (5)
Proof. In appendix A.









the above implies that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in the two
states for the b agent is less than or equal to the actuarially-fair price for the insurance only
if b agents accept it. This relation provides an intuition for the necessary condition (3). If it
were not to hold, c cannot be an equilibrium since a protable entry opportunity is always
available. A rm can provide additional insurance for agents of type b charging a price
slightly higher then the actuarially-fair one. Such deviation is always protable for the rm
and increases expected utility for the agents of type b. Similarly, the necessary conditions
(4) and (5) require that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in the two
states for agents of type g and m respectively is greater than the price for insurance when
8all agents accept the contract. If not, entrant insurance providers can protably provide
additional insurance to agents of type g and m. A direct implication of Lemma 1 is that
there is no pooling equilibrium, since there is no allocation that simultaneously satises the
conditions described in equations (3), and either (4) or (5).
Proposition 1. There is no pooling equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose there exists a pooling equilibrium c = (cL;cH). The equilibrium allocation





b p : So that g  b p, this is a contradiction since b < m < g implies
g > b p. In the second case with m > b p, from (3) and (5) we have that 1 m
m 
1 b p
b p : This
implies m  b p, a contradiction.
3.2 Separating equilibrium
We now study separating equilibria. For each type j = b;m;g denote the equilibrium




H). The separating equilibrium allocation is denoted
by c = fcb;cm;cgg. Since c is a separating equilibria there must exist at least one j and j0









0 = b;m;g: (6)
Before fully characterizing the equilibrium allocations we provide 3 Lemmas containing nec-
essary conditions that any separating equilibrium must satisfy. Lemma 2 focuses on the
magnitude of consumption for each type for each endowment realization. Lemma 3 provides
characterization of the consumption allocation based on the protability of particular combi-
nation of contracts. Finally, Lemma 4 provides characterization of the equilibrium allocation
based on the marginal propensity of each type of agent for buying additional insurance.
























Proof. In appendix A.
9The above lemma implies that the the allocation for the g type must be in the under-insurance
region, while the allocation of the b type must be in the over insurance region. The intuition
for this result is as follows: if the agents of type g were in the over insurance region, an
entrant might oer a small negative insurance contract at a price worse than the actuarially
fair one. Agents of type g will accept this contract. This contract will be protable even
if any other type accept it. The intuition for the case when b is underinsured is similar.
In addition, Lemma 2 states that consumption under the realization of the low endowment
must be weakly decreasing as agent type increases, while must be weakly increasing in type
upon the realization of the high endowment shock.9
Lemma 3. Any separating equilibrium allocation c = fcb;cm;cgg must satisfy:
b(!H   c
b
H) + (1   b)(!L   c
b









L)  0; 8 j = g;m: (11)
If c
m
L > !L; b pb;m(!H   c
m
H) + (1   b pb;m)(!L   c
m


















L)  0 (14)
(c
i   !)  0; i = g;m: (15)
Proof. In appendix A.
The proofs of the previous conditions share a common theme. If any of the conditions
in Lemma 3 is violated then an \entrant", a rm currently making zero prots, can deviate
and oer a contract that will make strictly positive prots independent of the type of agents
accepting it. Depending on the type of condition violated, an entrant will nd it protable to
oer either additional or substitute contracts. Additional contracts oer additional amounts
of positive or negative insurance. These contracts are always chosen in combination with
contracts already oered in equilibrium. Substitute contracts, as the name suggests, are
accepted instead of the equilibrium allocation. As an example suppose that condition (10)
is violated, in this case an entrant can provide a substitute contract to agents of type b that
is welfare improving and always protable. If condition (14) is violated, then an entrant can
9Lemma 2 applies to any equilibrium not only the separating one. For the pooling equilibrium, conditions
(7) and (8) imply that cL = cH this immediately implies a violation of condition (4) and (5) in Lemma 1 so
that a pooling equilibrium does not exist.
10provide an additional contract that agents of type m will accept together with the original
allocation of agents of type g.
The next Lemma, following similar steps to Lemma 1, characterizes equilibrium contracts
by focusing on the marginal propensity of agents to buy additional positive or negative
innitesimal amounts of insurance.




















1   b pb;m
b pb;m
: (17)
Proof. In appendix A.
We now complete the characterization of the unique equilibrium consumption allocation.
Let the candidate equilibrium be cb = (!b;!b) with !b = b!H + (1   b)!L and cm =
cg = (!L;!H). Notice that this allocation features pooling between agents of type m and
of type g. In particular the allocation provides no insurance for agents of type m and g
and instead provides full insurance at the actuarially-fair price to agents of type b. To aid
intuition, for the following proposition, we display key steps of the proof graphically for the
simpler two type case: j = b;g. Refer to gure 1(a). This gure displays in (cL;cH) space
the full insurance line (the 45 degree line), and the zero-prot lines if only good agents buy
the insurance, only bad and if all agents purchase the contract (market break even line). In
addition the separating equilibrium (cb;cg) with associated indierence curves is displayed.
Proposition 2. Any equilibrium allocation of the menu game satises: cb = (!b;!b), where
!b = b!H + (1   b)!L; cm = cg = (!L;!H).
Proof. In appendix A.
A key rst step of this proof involves showing that neither the good or the medium types
buy any insurance. In particular, the equilibrium allocation for these types cannot at the
same time: i) be preferred by each agent relative to the endowment point; ii) deliver positive
prots if only these agents buy it and iii) not be preferred by the bad type relative to his
equilibrium. Graphically, for the two type case, it implies that it cannot lie in the green-
shaded triangular area of gure 1(a). An illustration of this step is in gure 1(b). Suppose
that the separating equilibrium is given by (cb;cg) in the gure, where cg lies in the green-
shaded area. In this case an entrant can oer a contract such as Entry, which is always
11protable no matter which agent accepts it. In the presence of such contract, it is welfare
improving for agents of type b to choose the contract providing consumption allocation cg,
which contradicts cb being an equilibrium allocation. Note that cg + Entry cannot be an
equilibrium allocation for the consumption of agents of type b since cg is protable only if
agents of type g select it. In addition in the proof we show that in equilibrium there cannot
be cross subsidization across types, so that for example b(cb) < 0. The intuition is that
if it were the case that b(cb) < 0, then it must also be true that the insurance providers
are generating positive prots with either agents of type g or m (or both). In the proof it
is shown that an entrant can always \cream skim" agents of this type and make a positive
prot.10
















Good type break even
Market break even
Bad type break even
(a) Separating equilibrium in consumption space


















(b) Sketch of proof of Proposition 2.
Figure 1: Separating Equilibrium Case with pm = 0.
As in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), a separating equilibrium may fail to exist. In our
environment, we require the following necessary condition on primitives to guarantee the







1   b p
b p
; (18)
10We thank the co-editor and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on this point.
11An interesting extension left for future research is the characterization of equilibrium using random
menus. See Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a,b) for the study of existence of equilibrium in the case with
exclusive contracts. And also Carmona and Fajardo (2009) and Monteiro and Page (2008) for the case with
non-exclusive contracts.








1   b pb;m
b pb;m
: (19)
The above conditions are satised if, for example, g is large relative to m and b or if the
spread between !L and !H is suciently small.
Proposition 3. If Assumption 1 does not hold, there is no equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose (18) in Assumption 1 is violated. Consider an entrant rm oering a menu




u0(!H) >  >
1 b p
b p : As
shown in the proof of Lemma 4, b  is accepted by agents of type g: Ug(! + b ) > Ug(!).
This implies that g[u(!H   ")   u(!H)] + (1   g)[u(!L + ")   u(!L)] > 0: Since " > 0
and m < g it follows that m[u(!H   ")   u(!H)] + (1   m)[u(!L + ")   u(!L)] > 0,
so that Um(! + b ) > Um(!). Given this, minimum prots are achieved when also agents of
type b accept b . From the denition of  this deviation is always protable. This implies
that the consumption allocation allocation for agents of type g and m is not cg = !, which
contradicts Proposition 2 completing the result.






u0(!H). In this case there exists an  so that
1 b pm;g




entrant rm oering a menu containing b  = ( ";") with " > 0 and small. Note that in
this case b  consists of a negative form of insurance. In this case we have that both agents of
type m and g pick contract b  since 1 m
m >
1 g
g . From the denition of  this contract is
also protable. Hence the allocation is at the same time protable and preferred by agents
of type m and g, implying that the equilibrium allocation is not b cg = (! + b ) 6= !. This
contradicts Proposition 2 and the result follows.





b pb;m . In this case, as in the proof of Lemma 4, there always exists a protable deviation
from entrants that is accepted by agents of type m and is protable also in the case when
agent of type b accept it. The resulting consumption allocation for agents of type m is
b cm 6= !; by Proposition 2 this allocation cannot be an equilibrium. The result follows.
The necessary conditions for existence of equilibrium in Assumption 1 are stronger than
those found in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977). The previous proposition
provides an intuition on why this is the case. Relative to the case with exclusive contracts,
the non-exclusivity assumption introduces additional opportunities for protable deviations.
These deviations cannot be prevented and are severe enough that might induce prots for
the incumbents to became strictly negative. The lack of existence result is also conrmed
in Attar, Mariotti, and Salani e (2011a). Their environment features the same necessary
13conditions (once adapted for two types and preferences) as in Assumption 1. In Section
4.1, we consider how latent contracts can shut down some of deviations that were leading to
the lack of existence result in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). One fundamental issue that
leads to non-existence result present in both our paper and RS is the lack of any capacity
constraint. This issue has been raised by Inderst and Wambach (2001) where the standard
RS environment is complemented with capacity constraints in the amount of insurance that
an insurance can provide. In this case it is shown that an equilibrium exists.12 In our
environment (see also the discussion in Attar, Mariotti, and Salani e (2011a) section 3.5)
each insurance provider can service the entire market. Hence, an entrant can exploit this by
forcing an incumbent insurance provider to provide insurance to a larger number of types
than originally planned for.13
4 Implementation of Equilibrium
We now show that whenever Assumption 1 holds an equilibrium exists. The following propo-
sition shows, by construction, that the allocation (cb;cm;cg) characterized in Proposition 2
can be sustained in equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Let fg;m;b;!h;!l;u;pg;pm;pbg satisfy Assumption 1, then there exists
an equilibrium of the menu game.
The complete proof of Proposition 4 is provided in Appendix B. In what follows we show the
result in the simpler case with two types.14 Set pm = 0. In this case Assumption 1 reduces
to condition (18) only. Consider the following strategies by rms. Without loss of generality,












where L;b = b(!H   !L), H;b = (1   b)(!L   !H) and the set Lb is dened as follows:15
Lb =
n
xL  0;xH  0
     bxH   (1   b)xL = 0
o
:
12Similarly, in Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) the competitive search environment introduces a sort
of capacity constraint. In this paper an equilibrium always exists.
13In the pure trade environment with non exclusivity of Attar, Mariotti, and Salani e (2011b) an equilibrium
always exists. In this case the capacity constraint is in the form of the limited supply of goods that the seller
is endowed with.
14We thank an anonymous referee for providing insights in simplifying the proof in this case.
15Graphically, the transfer pair (xL;xH) 2 Lb is on the zero-prot line for agents of type b conditional on
providing positive insurance.
14All remaining rms i 6= 1;2 oer the menu: Ci = (0;0). It is easy to show that under







rms 1 and 2 and (0;0) from remaining rms; type g chooses (0;0) from all rms. In this
equilibrium, all rms make zero prots. Agents of type b and g receive allocations cb and
cg respectively. Suppose that rm i deviates and oers the contracts fb;gg respectively
to agents of type b and g. We do not rule out that b = g or that any of the two (but
not both) might be the null contract. As notation let i = (L;i;H;i). Consider the case
with L;g < 0 which means negative insurance is being oered to agents of type g. Since
Ug(! + g) > Ug(!), if L;g < 0, it follows that g(g) < 0.16 Also, since agents of type
b are fully insured at their actuarially fair price, they will only accept contracts for which
b(b) < 0. This implies that total prots from the deviation fb;gg are negative, hence we
rule out the case with L;g < 0. Consider the case with L;g > 0, i.e. positive insurance is
being oered to agents of type g. Consider the following transfer:
b  =

b(!H   !L + H;g   L;g); 
1   b
b
(!H   !L + H;g   L;g)

:
By construction b  2 Lb and can be chosen from either rm b i = 1;2 (for this step is crucial
to have Lb being oered by at least two rms in equilibrium, so that following deviation
of any rm i, Lb is still available to agents of type b). When combined with g, contract
b  provides full insurance for agents of type b. Consumption in both states is given by
!b + bH;g + (1   b)L;g. We must have that Ub(! + g + b )  Ub(! + b + 0) where 0 is
a contract in Lb. From concavity of preferences, since under g + b  agent b is fully insured,
it must be the case that b provides a higher expected value of transfers: b(b)  b(g).
Aggregate prots for the deviation are: pbb(b)+pgg(g)  pbb(g)+pgg(g) = (g) <
0: Where the last inequality follows from (18) in Assumption 1, hence there is no protable
deviation. This argument is displayed in Figure 2. The general proof for the case with
pm 6= 0 in Appendix B.
From the proof of existence, two key facts emerge. First in equilibrium at least two
rms must oer contracts dierent than the null one. If this was not the case, for example,
the single rm oering the non-null contracts would deviate oering additional insurance
to agents of type g at a price lower than the actuarially fair one. Second, the allocation
(cb;cm;cg) can be implemented as an equilibrium only if latent contracts are oered by both
rms. Failure to oer latent contracts in equilibrium, would allow entrants to protably oer
16Under Assumption 1, it can be shown that Ug(! +g)  Ug(! +g +0) for any 0 2 Lb. See Appendix
B for details.













Figure 2: Sketch of proof of Proposition 4 for pm = 0.
additional insurance to agents of type m and g.
4.1 The Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson Equilibrium
A natural benchmark to compare the results in this paper, is the classical environment with
exclusive contracts characterized in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977). With
exclusive contracts, under certain parameter restrictions, there exists a unique separating
equilibrium (referred to as RSW from here onwards). The RSW equilibrium is dened as
follows and is displayed in Figure 3(a).
Denition 2. The RSW separating equilibrium consumption allocation is (rb;rg) where rb =




H) such that Ub(rb) = Ub(rg) and g(rg   !) = 0.
Both equilibria with exclusive and non exclusive contracts feature agents of type b being
fully insured. However with non-exclusive contracts agents of type g (and m) receive no
additional insurance whereas in the RSW equilibrium agents of type g receive a positive
amount of insurance at their actuarially fair price. The intuition for why no amount of
insurance as in the RSW case can be oered with non-exclusive contract is straightforward.
Consider the RSW equilibrium consumption allocation. In this case an entrant can oer
additional insurance ^  for agents of type b at a price slightly worse than the actuarially
fair price. Upon entry agents of type b accept this additional insurance together with the
allocation rg. Given the price charged for insurance, this entry is always protable. The
16shaded area in Figure 3(a) displays the set of consumption that can be achieved with an
entrant oering ^ .
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) show that there is no pooling equilib-
rium when contracts are exclusive. A key intuition for this is that there is always an alter-
native contract that can be oered by an entrant that is protable and attracts only good
types (a cream-skimming deviation). With non-exclusive contracts a pooling equilibrium
also fails to exists, however the intuition is dierent. Indeed when agents sign non-exclusive
contracts, cream-skimming deviations can be prevented by using latent contracts. We pro-
vide an example in Figure 3(b). The solid lines represent the indierence curves for agents
of type b (the steeper curve) and g (the 
atter curve) at the best pooling equilibrium.17 Any
contract in the green shaded area in Figure 3(b) is preferred to the pooling equilibrium by
agents of type g but not by agents of type b. In addition it is protable for a rm as long as
only agents of type g, hence will constitute a protable deviation. This is not necessarily the
case under non-exclusivity. A rm can oer a latent contract, as example point L in Figure
3(b). This latent contract makes any contract oered in the green shaded area unprotable
since any point in the shaded are when combined with L is strictly preferred to the pooling
equilibrium also by agents of type b.














(a) Rg consumption for agents of type g, Rb con-
sumption for agents of type b.
















           L
Candidate
pooling EQ
(b) The role of latent contracts.
Figure 3: The Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson Equilibrium.
17The pooling equilibrium that delivers the highest expected utility when agents are weighted equally.
175 Conclusion
In this paper we characterize the equilibrium of a standard adverse selection economy in
which agents can sign simultaneous insurance contracts with more than one rm. We consider
the case with three types of agents: a good a medium and a bad type. Worse types represent
a higher probability of receiving the low endowment. Agents are privately informed on their
own types prior to signing any insurance contract. In this environment we show that there
is no pooling equilibrium and that under certain parameter restrictions there is a unique
equilibrium consumption allocation. When those parameter restrictions are violated an
equilibrium fails to exists. In the unique equilibrium, the bad type receives full insurance at
his actuarially-fair price. The good and medium type receive no insurance. Overall in this
environment, when an equilibrium exists, the amount of insurance provided in equilibrium is
reduced when compared with the environment in which agents sign exclusive contracts as in
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). An important message of this paper is that non-exclusivity
of contracts imposes strong restrictions on the insurance contracts that are oered, reducing
drastically the provision of insurance. The non-exclusivity friction discussed in this paper can
then be viewed as a positive institutional foundation for the strong regulations against the
multiplicity of insurance contracts observed in several insurance markets, such as property
and health insurance.
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20Appendix
A Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose a pooling equilibrium c exist where (3) does not hold. In this case we have









Consider a rm not originally active in equilibrium, an entrant, deviating and oering a










From (20) such an  exists.18 The contract b  is chosen by agents of type b together with the
original pooling equilibrium. To see this:
U
b(c + ^ ) = bu(cH   ") + (1   b)u(cL + ") (22)
expanding for small values of " we have
U









from the rst inequality in (21), " can be chosen small enough so that Ub(c + ^ ) > Ub (c).
Let  be the prot of the entrant. Since " > 0 minimum prots for the entrant occur when
only agents of type b accept b . So that   b(^ ) = b"   (1   b)" > 0. Where the
strict inequality follows from the second inequality of (21). Since a protable deviation exists
(trivially no latent contract can prevent this entry) we reach a contradiction with c being a
pooling equilibrium.






1   b p
b p
; (24)
As in the previous case, consider an entrant oering ^  = (cL   "   !L;cH + "   !H) for






1   b p
b p
: (25)
18The parameter  can be interpreted as the slope of a line passing between the zero-prot line of the bad
type and the slope of his indierence curve through c = (cL;cH).
21From (24) such an  exists. In this case, b  is accepted by agents of type g (b  will be a
substitute transfer to the pooling equilibrium, rather than an additional transfer as in the
previous case) to see this:
U
g(! + ^ ) = gu(cH + ") + (1   g)u(cL   ")
expanding for small values of ":
U













where the strict inequality follows from the rst inequality in (25). Let  be the prots of
the entrant. Let b px the probability of receiving a high realization of the endowment given
the types of agents that accept the entrant's menu. By denition  can be rewritten as:
 = b px (!H   cH   ") + (1   b px)(!L   cL + ")
= b px (!H   cH) + (1   b px)(!L   cL) + "(1   b px   b px)
Since agents of type g accept b , b px will be equal to one of the following fg; b p; b pb;g; b pm;gg.
From equation (3) it follows that (!H   cH) > (!L   cL), this implies that for small enough
", prots are decreasing in b px. From our assumption of m  b p we have that b p  b pb;g.
Minimum prots will be achieved when b px = b p: all agents accept the entrant contract. This
implies
  (c   !) + "(1   b p   b p) > (c   !)  0:
where the second inequality is given by the second inequality in equation (25) and the third
inequality from the condition on aggregate equilibrium prots (c   !) being non negative.
Since a protable deviation exists we reach a contradiction with c being a pooling equilibrium.






1   b p
b p
; (26)
similarly to the previous case, consider an entrant oering ^  = (cL   ";cH + ") with " > 0
and small. Given (26) and the fact that
1 g
g < 1 m
m there exist an  satisfying equation
(25). Proceeding as in the previous case we can show that the entrant contract will be
accepted by both agents of type m and g. In this case minimum prots for the entrant are
achieved when all agents accept b . Hence, as in the previous case, the entrant always makes
a strictly positive prot. Since a protable deviation exists we reach a contradiction with c
being a pooling equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2




L (the consumption of type g is













Consider an entrant rm oering the menu of transfers ^  = ( ";"). This menu constitutes
a form of negative insurance. For small enough ", we have that Ug(cg + ^ ) > Ug(cg), so that
agents of type g accept the entrant's contract. Minimum prots from ^  occur when only
agents of type g accept it. Prots from the deviation , are such that    g"+(1 g)" >
0, where the strict inequality follows from the second inequality in (27). We thus reach a
contradiction having found a protable deviation. The proof of condition (8) follows the
same steps of the proof of (3) in Lemma 1.
We next prove the condition in equation (9). We focus on the relation between quantities
for the agents of type g and m. The proof for the relation between quantities for agents of
type m and b is analogous. By contradiction suppose that c
g
H < cm
H from (6) it must also be
the case that cm
L < c
g










From (6) we also have that Um(cm)  Um(cg) and Ug(cg)  Ug(cm), summing these two






L))]  0. Substituting (28) we
get m > g a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Suppose (10) does not hold, we then have b(!H   cb
H) + (1   b)(!L   cb
L) > 0.
This implies that prots from the consumption allocation for agents of type b are strictly
positive. An entrant can oer the following contract ^  = (cb
L +    !L;cb
H   !H). With
 > 0 and small. We have that Ub(! + ^ ) > Ub(cb). Agents of type b will accept ^  to
their original equilibrium allocation. In addition prots for the entrant  are such that
  b(!H   cb
H) + (1   b)(!L   cb
L)   (1   b) > 0 when  is suciently small. We thus
reach a contradiction having found a deviation that is always protable.









L) > 0 (29)






H + ) with  > 0 and small.
In this case we have Ub(cj +) = bu(cb
H +)+(1 b)u(cb
L) > Ub(cb) so that agents of type
b will pick ^  together with the allocation originally chosen by agents of type j. As in the
proof of Lemma 1 let b px be the probability of receiving a high realization given the types of
agents that accept the entrant's menu. Prots for the entrant are









23From (9) we have that for small enough  prots are increasing in b px hence minimum prots







0: Where the last inequality follows from (29) and  suciently small. We thus reach a
contradiction having found a deviation that is always protable.
Suppose that by contradiction (12) is violated, then
b pb;m(!H   c
m
H) + (1   b pb;m)(!L   c
m
L) > 0; (30)
Consider an entrant deviating and oering the contract b  = (cm
L + ;cm
H) with  > 0 and
small. This contract will be accepted by agents of type m since it provides strictly greater
utility than the original consumption allocation cm. Prots from ^  are given by
 = b px(!H   c
m
H) + (1   b px)(!L   c
m
L   ):
With b px as above. Since cm
L > !L, prots are decreasing in b px. Since m agents accept
b , minimum prots are reached when agent of type m and b accept the contract. Hence
  b pb;m(!H   cm
H) + (1   b pb;m)(!L   cm
L   ) > 0. Where the last inequality follows from
(30) and  suciently small. We thus reach a contradiction having found a deviation that
is always protable.









L) > 0: (31)







with  > 0 positive and small. Since Ug(cm + ^ ) = gu(c
g
H + ) + (1   g)u(c
g
L) > Ug(cg),
agents of type g accept the entrant's contract. Prots for the entrant are given by















L together with (31), it implies
that prot are decreasing in b px, minimum prots are achieved when only the g type accepts






L) > 0: Where the last inequality follows from
equation (31) and a suciently small value of . We reach a contradiction having found a
protable entry.









L) > 0; (32)






H + ) with
 > 0 and small. This contract will be accepted by m types together with cg in the original
allocation. By (32) for  suciently small, prots are positive for any additional type that
also accepts the contract. We then reach a contradiction having found a deviation that is
always protable.
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The above can be interpreted as the prots originating from agents of type g choosing cg
both agents of type b and m choosing cm and nally agents of type b choosing the transfer
cb   cm. Using condition (11) and (14) in the above together with (cg   !) < 0 it follows

















b p(!H   c
m


















Using condition (11) and (13) in the above together with (cm !) < 0 it follows that  < 0
a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4













Where p = minfb p; b pb;gg. Consider an entrant rm oering a menu containing ^  = ("; ")
with " > 0 and small and  as in (36). Given small enough " together with the rst
inequality in (36) it follows that ^  is accepted by agents of type g since Ug(cg + ^ ) > Ug(cg).
Since ^  constitute positive insurance, minimum prots are decreasing in the probability of the
realization of a low endowment. Hence since agents of type g accept ^  and from the denition
of p we have that prots for the entrant are given by   p" (1 p)" > 0. Where the last
25inequality follows from the second inequality in (36). Having found a protable deviation
we reach a contradiction.








1   b pb;m
b pb;m
: (37)
As in the previous step consider an entrant rm oering a menu containing b  = ("; ")
with " > 0 and small. b  is accepted by agents of type m. Minimum prots are achieved when
only agents of type b and m accept the contract. In this case, from the second inequality in
(37), we have that the entrant makes positive prots. Having found a protable deviation
we reach a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Step 1












L) = 0: (38)
Suppose not, from (11) for j = m, it implies that b(cb   cm) < 0. Consider an entrant
oering a menu containing transfers  = fg;mg = fcg + (";0);cm + (";0)g. Suppose agents
of type g accept g. From (14) it follows that minimum prots are achieved when agents of
type b and m accept m. Rewriting aggregate prots as in (34) we have that total prots
for the entrant  satisfy the following:      pbb(cb   cm)   (1   b p)" >   0 where
the second inequality follows from b(cb   cm) < 0 and " suciently small.19 Having found
a protable entry we reach a contradiction and indeed (38) holds.








1   b pb;m
b pb;m
: (39)





H) <  <
1 b pb;m
b pb;m : Given such
, dene cm = cm   ("; ") with " > 0 and small enough so that, b;m(cm   cg) < 0.
We have that b;m(("; ")) = b pb;m"   (1   b pb;m)" < 0; where the last inequality follows
from the above denition of . Consider an entrant deviating and oering a menu con-
taining the following contract  = fg;mg = fcg + (1;0)   !;cm   !g with 1 > 0 and
small. We have that Ug(! + g) > Ug(cg) and Um(! + m) > Um(cm). If agents of type m
accept m and agent of type g accept g, since b;m(cm   cg)  0, minimum prots occur
when agents of type b accept m. Prots from the deviation in this case are given by20
   + g((1;0))   b;m(("; ")). This implies that for a given ", 1 can be chosen
19The case with agents of type g accepting m follows from (15).
20Recall that b(cb   cm) = 0.
26small enough so that  > 0 hence the deviation is protable and we reach a contradiction.21
Finally, suppose that agents of type m accept m and agents of type g accept m also. From
(15), it must be the case that (cm  !) = 0 else the deviation is immediately protable for
small enough ". From (35) together with (13) it implies that g(cg   cm) = 0 which implies
(cg   !) < 0 contradicting (15). Since a protable deviation exists we have that condition
(39) holds.
Step 2
We next show that (cg   !) = 0. Suppose not, from (15) for i = g it follows that
(cg   !) > 0. Consider the case where agents of type g purchase positive insurance:
c
g
L > !L; by Lemma 2 also agents of type m purchase positive insurance. In this case we
have g(cg   !) > 0.22 We consider two sub-cases identied with the relation between b p
and m. Suppose b p  m so that agent of type m are worse than the average \market"
type, it follows that b;g(cg   !)  (cg   !) > 0. In this case an entrant can oer
b  = (c
g
L + "   !L;c
g
H   !H) with " > 0 and small. b  will be accepted by the g type agents.
Also this entry remains protable for any additional type of agent that also accepts it, we
thus reach a contradiction.
Suppose now that b p < m, so that agent of type m are better than the average \market"
type. We show that an entrant adopting a \cream skimming" strategy with respect to
the agents of type m will make positive prots. Since b p < m, from (15) for i = m,
it follows that m(cm   !) > 0. We rst show that it must be the case that aggregate
prots from the allocation are zero:  = 0. Suppose not, consider an entrant oering
 = fg;mg = fcg + (";0);cm + (";0)g. From (14) it follows that minimum prots occur
when agents of type b accept m. If agents of type g accepts m then from (15) for i = m it
follows that the deviation makes positive prots. If agents of type g accept g then from (38)
and  > 0 it follows that " can be chosen small enough so that the deviation is protable.
Hence  = 0.
Since  = 0, from (34) when (cg  !) > 0, it also follows that b;m(cm cg) < 0. Hence














H): This condition on  implies that for small
enough ", Um(cm + ( ";")) > Um(cm), while Ub(cm + ( ";")) < Ub(cm). We show
that agents of type b will not pick ^  implying that the entrant makes positive prots hence
reaching a contradiction. Suppose by contradiction that agents of type b pick ^ . Given the
condition on  it must be the case that there exists an additional contract 0 available with
the incumbents so that Ub(cm + ( ";") + 0) > Ub(cb). We are going to show that the
existence of such 0 leads to a contradiction, since it would have been chosen in the original
equilibrium by agents of type b. As notation, let i
m be the transfer that an agent of type
m receives from incumbent rm i so that cm =
P
i2I i
m + !. Suppose that ^  is oered by
21The case where agents of type m accept g over m follows from (15).
22The case with c
g
L < !L under the contradicting assumption it implies g(cg   !) < 0 so that it must
be the case that m(cm   !) > 0 and cm
L > !L, a case which is analyzed below when looking at entrant
attracting agents of type m.
27a single rm i0.23 It must be the case that rm i0 also oers transfers i0
m; if not it would be
possible for agents of type b to achieve level of consumption cm + 0 which is preferred to cb
by agents of type b.
We now show an important property that must hold in any separating equilibrium: it is
always possible to reach consumption levels equal to cm with rms other than i0.24 Suppose
rm i0 deviates by withdrawing i0
m = (i0
L;m;i0
H;m) and instead oers (i0
L;m;i0
H;m  "), for this
deviation not to increase prots, it must be the case that agents of type m do not accept
(i0
L;m;i0
H;m ") from i0.25 This implies that is possible for agents of type m to pick alternative
transfers with rms other than i0 and reach a consumption level  cm so that Um(cm) = Um( cm).
It must be the case that cm =  cm. Suppose not, consider rst the case in which cm




H. In this case an entrant can oer the contract  = (cb
L    cm
L +";cb
H    cm
H) with
" > 0 and small. This contract will be accepted by agents of type b together with  cm. From
(38) and the fact that cm
L <  cm
L, it follows that for " suciently small this contract will be
protable for any additional type that accepts it. Suppose now that cm
L >  cm
L in this case an




H) with " > 0 and small. This contract
will be accepted by agents of type m together with  cm. From (39) and " suciently small
the contract will be protable for any additional type that accepts it.
Given the possibility of reaching a level of consumption cm with rms other than i0, it
follows that is possible for agents of type b to pick 0 together with cm, this is a contradiction
since it would have been chosen in equilibrium. Since no 0 exists, an entry oering ^  is al-
ways protable and we reach a contradiction. So that it must be the case that (cg !) = 0.
Step 3
Given (cg  !) = 0, we consider two sub-cases. Consider rst the case with g(cg  !) > 0,
from equation (14), (34) and (38) it follows that b pb;m(c
g
H   cm




It can be shown that equation (39) also holds in this case.26 We can then proceed as in
Step 2: in this case an entrant can \cream skim" agents of type m, hence the case with
g(cg   !) > 0 leads to a contradiction.
The only remaining case is (cg   !) = g(cg   !) = 0. This implies that cg = (!L;!H)
and cm
L  !L. Since b(cb   !)  0, we can have two sub-cases: either m(cm   !) > 0 or




i = 0 follows similarly. For this case the result
follows by also imposing the requirement that for each rm oering 0
i is never optimal to withdraw 0
i and
oer ^ .
24A similar results holds without free entry, see Attar, Mariotti, and Salani e (2011a) for details.
25If agents of type b or type g accept this contract following the deviation it follows that they would have




H;m). Also, if following the deviation, agents of type m choose the
contract that i0 was oering to agents of type g: i
0





g . In this case an always protable opportunity exist for entrants oering additional
small amounts of insurance at a rate protable if agents of type b and m accept it. From (39) it follows that
this entry will be accepted by agents of type m together with i
0
g reaching a contradiction.
26Note that the proof in Step 1 does not hold in this case. Instead to prove (39) proceed as follows. Suppose
not, then there exists a cm preferred to cm by agents of type m. Moreover, given that b;m(cm   cg) = 0,
cm has the property that b;m(cm  cg) > 0, following the steps used to prove (14) we reach a contradiction.
28m(cm   !) = 0. In rst sub-case, m(cm   !) > 0, we rewrite (33) as
 = (pb + pm)
h
b pb;m(!H   c
m





























L = !L and m(cm   !) > 0, from (9) it follows that cm
L > !L. Since g(cg   !) = 0
from (11), (12) and (40), it follows that b;m(cm   cg) = b(cb   cm) = 0. As shown before
we have that condition (39) must hold. Hence we reach a contradiction by showing that an
entrant can \cream skim" agents of type m. In the second sub-case, m(cm   !) = 0, from
(33) it follows that b(cb   !) = 0. From (11) it follows that cm = (!L;!H). Finally if the
agent of type b does not receive full insurance an entrant can provide a contract that agents
of type b strictly prefer and is always protable. The thesis follows.
B Proof of Proposition 4
Before proving the proposition we show the following Lemma.
Lemma 5. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Let c = (cL;cH) 6= (!L;!H), we have that















1   b pb;m
b pb;m
; (42)






1   b pb;m
b pb;m
; (43)









@cL < 0 and
@fg(cL;cH)
@cH > 0. We begin by showing equation (41). Consider
the case with cL > !L, since g(c   !)  0 it follows that cH < !H. From property of fj it
follows that fg(cL;cH) < fg(!L;!H) 
1 b p
b p . Where the last inequality follows from (18) in
29Assumption 1. Suppose now that cL < !L in this case since Ug(c)  Ug(!) it must be the
case that cH > !H in which case the result follows as before. The proof of equations (42)
and (43) are analogous.
We now move to the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof.
The proof is by construction. We rst describe strategies adopted by rms, and choices
of agents then we show that no incumbent or entrant wishes to deviate from the proposed












where L;b = b(!H   !L), H;b = (1   b)(!L   !H) and the set Lb is dened as follows
Lb =
n
xL  0;xH  0
     bxH   (1   b)xL = 0
o
:
All remaining rms i 6= 1;2 oer the menu: Ci = f(0;0)g. It is easy to show that under





from both rms 1 and 2 and (0;0) from remaining rms; types m and g choose
(0;0) from all rms. In this equilibrium, all rms make zero prots, and agents of type b, m
and g receive allocations cb, cm and cg respectively .
The proof proceeds in three steps. We consider in turn the case where a deviating rm
attracts one type (implying that at least one type chooses a contract dierent than the null
contract (0;0)), two types and nally the case where a deviating rm attracts all three types.
Step 1
Consider rm i deviating and oering the menu Ci = f;(0;0)g. Suppose that only one type
of agent picks  = (H;L). Agents of type b are fully insured at the actuarially fair price.
Hence if  is accepted by agents of type b it follows that b() < 0, the deviation results in
negative prots for rm i, hence we reach a contradiction. Suppose that  is accepted only
by agents of type j = m;g. Consider the case with L > 0. Consider the following choice
from agents of type b: accept  from rm i and pick an additional transfer b  2 Lb from
either i = 1;2 equal to
b  =

b(!H   !L + H   L); 
1   b
b
(!H   !L + H   L)

: (44)





:27 full insurance together with additional consumption in each state. This
implies Ub(! +  + b ) > Ub(cb). Hence, upon entry,  is chosen by agents of type b and of
type j reaching a contradiction with the assumption that  is accepted by only one type.
27Recall that !b = b!H + (1   b)!L. In addition, from Assumption 1, and Uj(! +  + 0) > Uj(!) for
some 0 2 Lb, it follows that bH + (1   b)L > 0.
30For the case with L < 0 it follows that if Uj(! +  + 0) > Uj(!) for some 0 2 Lb then
j() < 0.
Step 2
Suppose that rm i deviates and oers a menu Ci and that only two types of agent pick
elements in Ci dierent than (0;0). Suppose that agents of type b and of type m choose
non-null contracts in Ci, denoted by b and m respectively. Prots are given by  =
pbb(b) + pmm(m); as before b(b) < 0. Since agent of type m choose m over (0;0),
it must be the case that m provides positive insurance else m(m) < 0. Suppose this
is the case, from (19) in Assumption 1, it must be the case that b;m(m) < 0. As in
the previous step, consider the deviation of agents of type b, b  2 Lb, with b  dened in
(44). It must be the case that Ub(! + b + 0)  Ub(! + m + b ) where 0 is any contract
in Lb. Since m + b  provides full insurance and 0 2 Lb, due to concavity of the utility
function, the expected transfers from b must be weakly higher than transfers from m + b 







We thus reach a contradiction since the entrant is making negative prots. Using a similar
strategy as in the previous step for agents of type b, it can be shown that the case where only
agents of type m and g accept the non-null contracts (m;g) leads to a contradiction since
agents of type b will strictly prefer m combined to b  as in (44) with respect to (0,0). As a
nal case suppose that only agents of type b and g accept the non-null contract (b;g). In
this case it immediately follows that agents of type m prefer g to (0;0). Hence an entrant
must necessary attract all three types, a case we consider next.
Step 3
Finally, suppose that rm i deviates and oers a menu Ci. The only remaining case is to
consider when all three types of agents b, m and g, pick contracts dierent than (0;0) with
a deviating rm i. Denote these contract respectively by b, m and g (we don't exclude
the case that any two might be equal). For rm i, prots are given by  = pbb(b) +
pmm(m) + pgg(g). We rst show that g(g) > 0. Suppose not, we then have  
pbb(b) + pmm(m). Following Step 2 it follows that  < 0 reaching a contradiction with
g(g)  0. Let g = (L;g;H;g). Since g(g) > 0 it must be the case that L;g > 0. Rewrite
 as:
 = (g) + (pm + pb)
b;m(m   g) + pb
b(b   m) (45)
From (18) in Assumption 1 it follows that (g) < 0. As before b(b m)  0. To complete
the proof we show that b;m(m   g)  0. If m = g we are done. Suppose m 6= g. From









31so that Um(! + g)  Um(! + g + 0) for any 0 2 Lb.28 Similarly, it must be the case
that Ug(! + g) > Ug(! + g + 0) for any 0 2 Lb. Let m = (L;m;H;m). It must be the
case that 0 < L;g < L;m if not Ug(! + g)  Ug(! + m + 0) for any 0 2 Lb implies
Um(! + g) > Um(! + m + 0), for any 0 2 Lb. Consider the case with g(m)  0. From
(43) we have that Um(! +m)  Um(! +m +0) for any 0 2 Lb. Given the choice of agent
of type m it must be then the case that Um(! + m)  Um(! + g), from equation (42) it
then follows that b;m(m   g) < 0.
Given the assumption of Lemma 5, a case that needs to be proved separately is the case
where g(m) < 0. This case implies that m(m) < 0, it is immediate that g(m  g) < 0
which implies b;m(m   g) < 0
Since (g) < 0, b;m(m   g)  0 and b(b   m)  0, from equation (45) if follows
that  < 0. Since there is no protable deviation the result follows.
28Intuitively this is because the slope of the indierence curve at ! + g is 
atter than the slope of Lb.
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